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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Kate S. Cook*
Brandon L. Peak"
John C. Morrison I***
and Tedra C. Hobson****
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article seeks to identify and explain the cases and legislation
published and enacted within the survey period between June 1, 2008
and May 31, 2009, which impact, illustrate, clarify, or change Georgia's
law as it relates to trial practice and procedure.'

* Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. University of the South (B.A., magna cum laude, 1998); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2002). Member, Mercer Law
Review (2000-2002); Eleventh Circuit Survey Editor (2001-2002). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., summa cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, Mercer Law Review (2002-2004);
Articles Editor (2003-2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2006). Member, Mercer Law Review (20042006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Emory University (B.A., 2000); Georgetown Public Policy Institute (M.P.P., 2004);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2007). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practice and Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 397 (2008).
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LEGISLATION

Georgia General Assembly Senate Bill 2762 became effective January
1, 2009, and amends section 33-7-11 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.),8 Georgia's uninsured motorist statute, in the
following notable ways: (1) to specifically exclude the applicability of
umbrella or excess liability policies, "unless affirmatively provided for in
such policies or in a policy endorsement"; (2) to clarify that the filing of
a bankruptcy petition by an uninsured motorist does not impact the
uninsured motorist's "legal liability" for purposes of section 33-7-11; and
(3) to provide for stacking of uninsured motorist policies with and in
addition to automobile liability coverage, unless such stacking coverage
is specifically rejected by the policyholder.4 This is an extremely
important development for the personal injury practitioner, and careful
study should be given to the applicability of uninsured motorist cases.
If a client has any uninsured motorist coverage, they will now be able to
access or stack that uninsured motorist coverage without any offset for
the liability coverage.5 Previously, uninsured motorist coverage was
only applicable when the uninsured motorist coverage exceeded available
liability coverage.'
Effective May 4, 2009, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-137.17 provides that potential
jurors are not de facto disqualified from serving on cases involving an
electric membership corporation of which they are members.' The
statute, however, reserves the trial court's discretion to disqualify a
potential juror if there is specific evidence of impermissible bias or
prejudice. 9

2. 2008 Ga. Laws 1192.
3. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2009).
4. 2008 Ga. Laws at 1192-96 (amending O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(aX3)-(4), (b)(1)(D)); see also
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 293 Ga. App. 8, 666 S.E.2d 83 (2008); Stephen L. Cotter et
al., Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 191, 199-201 (2008).
Although insurers are obligated to provide notice of these new opportunities to elect
uninsured motorist benefits prior to the renewal of automobile or uninsured motorist
policies occurring after the Bill's effective date, insurers are not obligated to contact
insureds regarding the renewal of policies for which insureds have previously refused
uninsured motorist coverage. See O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (bX1)(DXiiXIII).
5. See O.C.GA § 33-7-11(b)(1XDXii)(1); Cotter et al., supra note 4, at 200.
6. See O.C.G-A. § 33-7-11(a)(1XB) (2000) (amended 2009).
7. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-137.1 (Supp. 2009).
8. Id.

9. Id.
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Also effective May 4, 2009, newly added O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(d)-(e) l°
excludes products and public nuisance liability for manufacturers when
such causes of action are "based on theories of market share or
enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.""
III.

CASE LAW

A.

Filing, Dismissal,Renewal, and Amendments of Actions
The advent of electronic filing continues to present new issues for
Georgia appellate courts. In Batesville Casket Co. v. Watkins Mortuary,
Inc.," the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a renewal
action that was physically fied in Fulton County State Court within the
requisite six months under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a),"3 but not electronically
filed until after the expiration of the six months. 4 The plaintiff's
argument that e-filing is a "form" for filing actions contemplated by
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3(b) 5 was rejected by the court of appeals. 6
How plaintiffs can refile voluntarily dismissed actions under Georgia's
renewal statute continues to be refined.
In Shy v. Faniel,8 the
plaintiff fied a second duplicative complaint within days of filing the
first complaint. The plaintiff later dismissed the second complaint and
then filed two dismissals of the first complaint, one dismissing the defendants-appellants "without prejudice" and the second dismissing other codefendants "with prejudice." The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's
third action, finding it was prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a).' 9 The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that the filing of the second
complaint was not a renewal action, and therefore, the plaintiff was
legally permitted to file the third complaint.2'

10.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(d)-(e) (Supp. 2009).

11. Id.
12. 293 Ga. App. 854, 668 S.E.2d 476 (2008).
13. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2007).
14. Batesville Casket Co., 293 Ga. App. at 855, 668 S.E.2d at 478.
15. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3(b) (2006). This statute provides that the "failure to accurately
complete [a] civil case filing form [shall not] provide a basis to dismiss a civil action." Id.
16. See Batesville Casket Co., 293 Ga. App. at 855, 668 S.E.2d at 478.
17. See O.C.GA. § 9-2-61 (2007); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) (2006).
18. 292 Ga. App. 253, 663 S.E.2d 841 (2008).

19. Id. at 254, 663 S.E.2d at 842.
20. Id. at 255, 663 S.E.2d at 842. The court of appeals also rejected the application of
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41, as amended by 2003 Ga. Laws 820, 824 (which reduced the number of
allowed refilings from three to two) to the plaintiffs action originally filed before the
amended statute's effective date of July 1, 2003, even though the third complaint was filed
after such date. See Shy, 292 Ga. App. at 255, 663 S.E.2d at 843; accord Controlled
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In National Office Partners,L.P. v. Stanley,2 the court of appeals
illustrated the importance of immediately ensuring a defendant is
correctly named and served, rather than relying upon O.C.G.A. § 9-1013222 to correct misnomers.' In Stanley the plaintiff filed suit against
National Office Partners Capitol LP, stating in his complaint this entity
was a Texas corporation. He then served CT Corporation System as the
registered agent, who returned the papers to the plaintiff's counsel,
claiming it was not an agent for service of process for the named entity.
In fact, CT Corporation System was the registered agent for National
Office Partners, L.P., a Texas limited partnership that was registered to
do business in the state of Georgia. National Office Partners, L.P. was
the entity whom the plaintiff intended to sue. After default judgment
was entered against National Office Partners Capitol LP, the trial court
allowed the plaintiff to correct the name of the defendant as a misnomer
under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-132 to National Office Partners, L.P.' The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff had to move for the
substitution of a new party under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1525 because CT
Corporation System refused to accept or acknowledge service of the
original complaint.26
B.

Service of Process
In Atcheson v. Cochran,27 the court of appeals highlighted the
importance of serving a defendant with due diligence when a suit is filed
shortly before the statute of limitations is set to expire. In Atcheson the
plaintiffs filed their suit nine days before the expiration of the statute
of limitations and did not perfect service until nearly three months after

Blasting, Inc. v. Viars, 293 Ga. App. 284, 284, 666 S.E.2d 626, 627 (2008). The court of
appeals lastly considered and rejected the notion that the plaintiffs dismissal of a codefendant "with prejudice" barred the subsequent third complaint on res judicata grounds.
See Shy, 292 Ga. App. at 256, 663 S.E.2d at 844.
21. 293 Ga. App. 332, 667 S.E.2d 122 (2008).
22. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-132 (2007).
23. See Stanley, 293 Ga. App. at 335, 667 S.E.2d at 125.
24. Id. at 332-33, 667 S.E.2d at 123.
25. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15 (2006).

26. See Stanley, 293 Ga. App. at 334-35, 667 S.E.2d at 124-25. The court of appeals
contemporaneously determined that the registered agent was excused for not equating
National Office Partners Capitol LP with National Office Partners, L.P. when both were

Texas business entities operating in Georgia. Id. Because the difference in naming was
disparate enough to cause credible confusion over the identity of the defendant, and
because the plaintiff affirmatively identified the entity as a Texas corporation in his
complaint, the possibility of alternate trade names for the named defendant was implicitly

ruled out. See id.
27. 297 Ga. App. 568, 677 S.E.2d 749 (2009).
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such expiration.2 8 The court of appeals held that although the evidence
suggested the defendants were purposefully avoiding service, this delay
was not excused because the plaintiffs allowed almost a month to elapse
between hiring their first and second investigators to locate the
Additionally, the plaintiffs never sought to perfect
defendants.'
"service by publication based on the defendant's conduct."'
Examinationand Cross-Examination
In a surprising opinion limiting the effective use of cross-examination
to explore prejudices at trial, the court of appeals in McClellan v.
Evans"l affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' pretrial
motion in limine to cross-examine the defendant.3 2 The motion
concerned an agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs'
uninsured motorist carrier, who was defending in the defendant's name
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(d),33 in which the uninsured motorist
carrier agreed to waive its subrogation claims.34 The motion sought to
explore the defendant's potential bias stemming from such an agreement. 35 Balancing the necessity for a thorough cross-examination
against the risks of admitting insurance testimony at trial, the court of
appeals concluded that because the plaintiffs "failed to establish that
Evans had promised anything to Georgia Farm in exchange for the
waiver of subrogation or that the waiver was in any way contingent on
the content of Evans's testimony," the agreement between Evans and the
plaintiffs' insurance company should have been excluded.3" This
conclusion, however, fails to recognize the reality that persons may not
truthfully disclose exactly what they agreed to do in exchange for an
insurance company waiving its subrogation interest. This ruling also
prohibits a jury from evaluating the credibility of a witness upon his or
her response to such questioning. Practitioners wishing to explore such
agreements at trial should, therefore, establish the scope of the
agreement between a defendant and an insurance company during
discovery.
C.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 568, 677 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 570-71, 677 S.E.2d at 752.
Id. at 570, 677 S.E.2d at 752.
294 Ga. App. 595, 669 S.E.2d 554 (2008).
Id. at 596, 669 S.E.2d at 555-56.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(d) (2006).
McClellan, 294 Ga. App. at 596, 669 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 597, 669 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 596-97, 669 S.E.2d at 556.
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D. Appearance of Impropriety by Trial Court
The court of appeals in Wilson v. McNeely37 addressed whether a trial
judge must recuse from a case when a fellow judge from the same
district is the defendant.' In accordance with Canon 2 of the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 the court vacated all rulings and held that
the trial judge should have recused because "it was inappropriate for the
trial judge... to preside over and rule upon the matter, wherein one of
was also a judge sitting on a court within the same
the parties
°
circuit."

E.

ClosingArgument
The jury in Kennebeck v. Glover4 returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed on the grounds the plaintiff's
counsel erred during closing argument by suggesting that: (1) the
plaintiff's medical bills were not as costly as they might have otherwise
been because he was treated by a military doctor; and (2) the jury should
calculate the plaintiff's pain and suffering by multiplying the plaintiff's
medical bills by a certain number because that is often how defendants
calculate damages for pain and suffering.42 Citing the wide latitude
afforded to counsel during closing arguments, the court of appeals held:
(1) because the plaintiff submitted evidence that he was treated at a
military base, his counsel did not err in arguing that the medical bills
were cheaper than they otherwise might have been; and (2) because the
plaintiff's counsel did not refer to specific damage awards in other cases,
he did not err in suggesting a possible method for the jury to calculate
pain and suffering damages. 3
F Privilege and Work Product Protection
In Fulton DeKalb HospitalAuthority v. Miller & Billips," a law firm
sued the hospital authority under the Georgia Open Records Act 45 to
obtain internal investigation records of alleged sexual misconduct by
members of the hospital authority's human resources department. The

37. 295 Ga. App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (2008).
38. Id. at 41, 670 S.E.2d at 846-47.
39. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Wilson, 295 Ga. App. at 41-42, 43, 670 S.E.2d at 847-48.
294 Ga. App. 822, 670 S.E.2d 459 (2008).
Id. at 826-27, 670 S.E.2d at 463-64.
Id.
293 Ga. App. 601, 667 S.E.2d 455 (2008).
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 to -77 (2009).
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hospital authority argued the documents were part of an internally
generated work product investigation ordered and supervised by its
attorney in anticipation of litigation.4 After conducting an in camera
review of the documents, the trial court found the documents were not
work product and instead "constituted a routine review of complaint
allegations and was no different from investigations ordinarily conducted
by the Authority's security department."47
The hospital authority appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed,
noting that "[attorney participation ... does not necessarily bring
One interesting aspect
material within the work product protection.'
of this opinion is its reasoning that "the evidence support[ed] the
conclusion that any expectation of litigation was based on speculation,
rather than a reasonable belief of probable legal action."4 9 This
important language indicates some form of overt threat of litigation may
now be necessary for parties to rely on the work product protection when
no suit or administrative proceedings have commenced.
The court of appeals rendered an important opinion regarding the
accountant-client privilege in Saye v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP.5° The
plaintiff in Saye was terminated from her job after the defendant sent
a letter to the plaintiff's employer specifying it would not rely on
representations from the plaintiff when auditing the employer's financial
statements. The plaintiff filed suit and asserted causes of action for
libel, slander, and tortious interference with business and employment
relations. The trial court dismissed, finding, inter alia, the defendant's
communications were protected by the accountant-client privilege.5
An important issue on appeal was whether the accountant-client
privilege was an absolute or conditional privilege.52 If the privilege was
absolute, the defendant could not be sued for defamation. 3 If the
privilege was conditional, the defendant could be sued if the communication was proven malicious.' Writing for the court, Judge Bernes noted
accountant-client communications are conditionally, rather than
absolutely, privileged under the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 51-5-86r

46. Miller & Billips, 293 Ga. App. at 601, 667 S.E.2d at 456.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 603, 667 S.E.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 604, 667 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
295 Ga. App. 128, 670 S.E.2d 818 (2008).
Id. at 128, 129, 670 S.E.2d at 820.
See id. at 131, 670 S.E.2d at 821.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (2000).
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because they "cannot be characterized as being made in official court
documents or within acts of legal process."56
G.

Expert Witnesses
The trial court in Houston v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital,Inc. 7
dismissed the plaintiffs' medical malpractice complaint after finding that
the plaintiffs' expert's affidavit failed to comply with the requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(c).68 The basis of the plaintiffs' complaint was
that a defendant nurse failed to thoroughly triage one of the plaintiffs
who suffered a stroke, which if the nurse had promptly recognized and
treated, the harmful effects to the plaintiff could have been minimized.59 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1, ° the plaintiffs filed the
affidavit of a nurse who opined that the defendant nurse's actions
deviated from the standard of care. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs' affiant-who had
experience as a family practice nurse, labor and delivery nurse, and
clinical nursing instructor-did not have experience working as a triage
nurse in an emergency room, and the plaintiffs appealed."1
Reversing the trial court, 62 the court of appeals noted that
the plaintiff's expert does not have to have knowledge and experience
in the same area of practice/specialty as the defendant[.] Instead....
the issue is whether the expert has knowledge and experience in the
practice or specialty that is relevant to the acts or omissions that the
plaintiff alleges constitute malpractice and caused the plaintiff's
injuries.6

The court held that because "the relevant area of nursing practice was
the assessment and triage of acute patients, and [the plaintiff's expert
nurse's] affidavit and curriculum vitae showed that she had ongoing
practical experience in the area of patient triage," and because patient
triage is not "exclusively within the professional skills of emergency
room nurses," the affidavit was appropriate.' This opinion reaffirms

56. Saye, 295 Ga. App. at 132, 670 S.E.2d at 822.
57. 295 Ga. App. 674, 673 S.E.2d 54 (2009).
58. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(c) (Supp. 2009); Houston, 295 Ga. App. at 675-76, 673 S.E.2d
at 56.
59. Houston, 295 Ga. App. at 675, 673 S.E.2d at 55-56.
60. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
61. Houston, 295 Ga. App. at 675-76, 673 S.E.2d at 56.
62. Id. at 679-80, 673 S.E.2d at 59.
63. Id. at 679, 673 S.E.2d at 58 (alterations in original) (quoting Nathans v. Diamond,
282 Ga. 804, 806, 654 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2007)).
64. Id.
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that an otherwise qualified expert should be entitled to render an
opinion so long as he or she has "practical experience" in the standard
of care that was breached, even though he or she may not practice in the
same specialty or setting at issue.
Similarly, in Hamilton-King v. HNTB Georgia, Inc.,6 the court of
appeals checked a trial court's "enthusiastic embrace of its 'gatekeeper'
role" and reversed the trial court's ruling striking a qualified expert
witness.6 The court importantly noted that although trial courts are
permitted to consider the federal precedent regarding the admissibility
of expert testimony, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 does not require or command
them to do so, and the trial court's inquiry must remain "flexible"
because the key inquiries are whether the testimony is relevant and
reliable. 7
The opinion in Hamilton-King is important because it stops what has
been a dangerous trend following the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.
Specifically, when an expert is qualified and his opinions will assist the
jury in understanding an issue beyond their ordinary knowledge,
Hamilton-King makes clear the expert's testimony should go to the jury
so that the jury, and not the trial court, can assess the credibility of the
expert's testimony."
H.

Discovery Sanctions
In AMLI Residential Properties,Inc. v. GeorgiaPower Co.,69 the court
of appeals upheld the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence as a
spoliation sanction. 0 This case arose from an apartment fire, and the
primary issue in the case was whether an overheated ground rod caused
the fire. Without informing the defendant, the plaintiff had an expert
perform a metallurgical examination of the remains of one of the ground
rods.71 The defendant then retained an expert who examined the
remains of the ground rods and testified that the metallurgical testing
of the ground rod "permanently altered" the rod, preventing testing that
could "check the validity of [the plaintiff's] theory of causation."7 2 The
trial court, therefore, granted a motion in limine to exclude evidence

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

296 Ga. App. 864, 676 S.E.2d 287 (2009).
Id. at 866, 676 S.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 868, 676 S.E.2d at 290; see O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
See Hamilton-King, 296 Ga. App. at 869, 676 S.E.2d at 291.
293 Ga. App. 358, 667 S.E.2d 150 (2008).
Id. at 364, 667 S.E.2d at 155-56.
Id. at 360, 667 S.E.2d at 153.

72. Id.
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pertaining to the ground rod and granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion because no triable issue on causation remained.7 3
The plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in imposing
spoliation sanctions, mainly on the ground there was no bad faith in the
destruction of evidence.74 The court of appeals held "[elxclusionary
sanctions may be appropriate where the spoliator has not acted in bad
faith."7' The court noted a distinction between

"the accidental, random, or unintended dissipation of evidence by
persons having no interest in its preservation," and those cases where
"a party knowledgeable of litigation strategy, tactics, and policies who
invokes the aid and jurisdiction of the Court and its processes... acted
unfairly to preclude the opportunity of an adversary to be apprised of
the existence of a defense to a plaintiff's claims."76
In that context, the court held that the plaintiff's "destructive testing
without notice to [the defendant]-though not judged to be in bad
faith-was nevertheless wrongful," and the spoliation sanction was
appropriate.7 7
I. Default Judgment
In Hiner Transport, Inc. v. Jeter,7 the court of appeals held that a
default judgment may not be based upon a defendant's failure to answer
an amended complaint, even if the amended complaint added the
defendant as a party.79 The court held that "[aibsent an order to
respond, '[an amended complaint adding a new party defendant does not
require a responsive pleading.'""0 Thus, when adding a new party
defendant to a case, the practitioner should consider adding language in
a proposed order to add a new party, requiring that the new party
answer the amended complaint."'

73. Id. at 360-61, 667 S.E.2d at 153.
74. Id. at 361,667 S.E.2d at 154. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant suffered
no prejudice and that any alleged prejudice could be cured. Id.
75. Id. at 363, 667 S.E.2d at 155.
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N. Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 284
(D. Me. 1993)).

77. Id. at 364, 667 S.E.2d at 155.
78. 293 Ga. App. 704, 667 S.E.2d 919 (2008).
79. Id. at 705, 667 S.E.2d at 920.
80.

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Stubbs v. Pickle, 287 Ga. App. 246, 247,

651 S.E.2d 171, 172 (2007)).
81. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-21 (2006) (specifying that parties may only be added upon order
of the court).
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J.

Final Judgment and Right to Appeal
During the survey period, Georgia courts decided a number of cases
dealing with the issue of when a judgment is considered final, such that
the judgment is immediately appealable. In fact, the Georgia Supreme
Court decided two such cases on the same day. In American Medical
Security Group, Inc. v. Parker,2 the supreme court held that a discovery sanction dismissing a party's answer and entering a default
judgment on liability is not a final order that is directly appealable.'
The court concluded that the order was simply a discovery order under
In addition, the
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37' and not a contempt order."
court clarified the difference between a discovery sanctions order and a
civil contempt order: "civil contempt is designed to force the contemnor
to comply with an order of the court, whereas a sanction,. . . in contrast,
lacks any prospective effect and is not designed to compel compliance."8
In refusing to characterize the trial court's order as immediately
appealable, the supreme court focused on policy rationales. Particularly,
the court emphasized that O.C.G.A § 9-11-37 is "'designed to protect
courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during
the discovery process'" and that immediate appeals of discovery orders
"'would undermine trial judges' discretion to structure a sanction in the
most effective manner.' "s7 In other words, if harsh discovery sanctions
were immediately appealable, trial judges would be hesitant to enter
them out of fear that the sanction would just create more delay. If that
were the case, intransigent parties would be rewarded for their delay
instead of punished for it.
K. Estoppel and Res Judicata
In World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mutual Insurance Co.,88
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed a conflict in Georgia law between the well-established rule
that estoppel cannot create liability under an insurance policy for risks
not covered by the policy, and seemingly contradictory case law, which

82. 284 Ga. 102, 663 S.E.2d 697 (2008).
83. Id. at 102, 663 S.E.2d at 698.
84. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37 (2006).
85. Parker,284 Ga. at 105, 663 S.E.2d at 700.
86. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton County,
527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999)).
87. Id. at 106, 663 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 208-09).
88. No. 1:07-CV-1675-RWS, 2008 WL 5111218 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2008).
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held estoppel could function to make an insurer liable for a risk not
covered by the policy when it undertook to defend its insured without a
reservation of rights.89 The defendant insurer in World Harvest
defended the plaintiff in a breach of contract suit for eleven months and
then withdrew representation because the lawsuit was not covered under
the insured's policy; a fact that was not disputed. 90
The court clarified that an insurer could be estopped from denying
liability under a policy for risk that was not actually covered by the
terms of the policy only when the insurer's actions prejudiced its
insured.9 In this case, there was no evidence of prejudice, and the
insurer was, therefore, not estopped from asserting the defense of
noncoverage.92
In Dennis v. First National Bank of the South,93 the Georgia Court
of Appeals provided insight regarding when adjudication of issues in a
dispossessory proceeding will preclude the relitigation of those same
issues in a subsequent lawsuit against a lender. In Dennis the plaintiffs
sued the original holder of their mortgage for fraud and conversion.'
A subsequent assignee of the mortgage successfully sought a writ of
possession against the plaintiffs, and in that proceeding the "core issues"
in the case were litigated before the court.95 Nonetheless, neither
collateral estoppel nor res judicata prevented the plaintiffs from bringing
a claim for fraud and conversion against the original holder because
there was no privity between the original lender and the subsequent
assignee of the debt.96 The court of appeals reasoned that the defendant (the original lender) was not in privity with the lender that
litigated the dispossessory action because the defendant was a predecessor in interest that transferred its interest in the property prior to the
commencement of the dispossessory action. 97

89.

See id. at *2-3.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id.
293 Ga. App. 890, 668 S.E.2d 479 (2008).
Id. at 890, 668 S.E.2d at 481.
See id. at 893, 668 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 894, 668 S.E.2d at 483.
Id.
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L. Limitations Defenses
Although in 2007 in Kaminer v. Canas,9" the Georgia Supreme Court
rejected the "discovery" rule in medical malpractice cases, 9 in Amu v.
Barnes,1" the supreme court nonetheless affirmed the continuing
viability of the "new injury" rule.' 1 The court in Amu emphasized
that the new injury rule "applies only in the 'most extreme circumstances'°10 2 and requires both that the plaintiff remained asymptomatic for
a period of time after the misdiagnosis and that the medical condition
arising from the misdiagnosis did not in fact exist at the time of the
misdiagnosis. 3
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument in Schramm v.
Lyon"° that the statute of repose for medical negligence "° started
to run on the first day the doctor treated the plaintiff.1° Instead,
when a plaintiff alleges multiple independent instances of medical
negligence, those independent acts that fall within the period of repose
are not barred simply because the physician began treating the plaintiff
a separate negligent act was committed
at an earlier date or because
07
outside the state of repose.1
An insurance policy in Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail, Inc.'0
required the insured to bring legal action against the insurer within one
year of the denial of a claim."9 When the insurer's denial letter
invited the insured to dispute the denial, which the insured did, the jury
could then find the claim was not denied until the insurer sent another
letter denying the claim a second time.1 °
The court of appeals interpreted the limitations period in the
insurance policy narrowly and held that because the plaintiff filed an

98. 282 Ga. 830, 653 S.E.2d 691 (2007). For additional discussion of this case, see
Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60
MERCER L. REv. 397, 400-01 (2008).
99. Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 832, 653 S.E.2d at 694.

100. 283 Ga. 549, 662 S.E.2d 113 (2008).
101. Id. at 554, 662 S.E.2d at 118.
102. Id. at 552, 662 S.E.2d at 116 (quoting Burt v. James, 276 Ga. App. 370, 374, 623
S.E.2d 223, 227 (2005)).
103. Id., 662 S.E.2d at 116-17 (citing Amu v. Barnes, 286 Ga. App. 725, 729, 650
S.E.2d 288, 292 (2007)).
104. 285 Ga. 72, 673 S.E.2d 241 (2009).
105. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (2007).
106. Schramm, 285 Ga. at 73-74, 673 S.E.2d at 242.
107. Id. at 74, 673 S.E.2d at 242.
108. 294 Ga. App. 147, 668 S.E.2d 732 (2009).
109. Id. at 149, 668 S.E.2d at 734.
110. See id. at 150-51, 668 S.E.2d at 735.
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arbitration claim within a year after the denial, the insured satisfied the
policy's requirement that he institute legal action within one year."'
Thus, the provision did not bar the insured's subsequent lawsuit, which
was filed more than one year after the denial letter. 2
However, pursuant to binding precedent, the court of appeals in
Thorton v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co."3 held that an
insurance policy's contractual, one-year limitations period for bringing
a claim under the policy was not tolled during the time the claim was
being processed."" The court noted that "'[slubstantial delays are
built into standard insurance policies,'" and the court called upon the
legislature to consider enacting a statute to allow such tolling." 5
In Wilks v. Overall Construction, Inc.,"' a homeowner brought an
action for breach of contract to improve real property against a
contractor for faulty construction of a wall and failed subsequent
attempts to remedy the problem." 7 The court of appeals rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the four-year statute of limitations for damage
to property applied and that the statute of limitations began to run at
the time of the final "unworkmanlike" attempted repair."8 Instead,
the six-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts
applied and began to run on the date the work contracted for was
substantially completed." 9
1. Statute of Repose. In Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co.,12° the court
of appeals applied Georgia's ten-year statute of repose 121 to a strict
liability claim brought under Texas law.'22 The court held as a matter
of first impression that a statute of repose is procedural and is therefore
governed by Georgia law under choice-of-law rules.'2 3
2. Tolling. Georgia law provides that the statute of limitations is
tolled for tort claims brought by victims of crimes until the prosecution

111. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 735-36.
112. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 735.
113. 297 Ga. App. 132, 676 S.E.2d 814 (2009).
114. See id. at 135, 676 S.E.2d at 817.
115. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nicholson v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 517
F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
116. 296 Ga. App. 410, 674 S.E.2d 320 (2009).
117. Id. at 411, 674 S.E.2d at 322.
118. Id. at 412, 674 S.E.2d at 322.
119. See id. at 412-13, 674 S.E.2d at 322-23.
120. 297 Ga. App. 835, 678 S.E.2d 489 (2009).
121. O.C.GA. § 51-1-11 (2008 & Supp. 2009).

122. Bagnel, 297 Ga. App. at 837, 678 S.E.2d at 493.
123. Id.
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z the
of the crime is final or terminated.12
In Beneke v. Parker,"
court of appeals initially held that a violation of the Uniform Rules of
the Road12 constituted a crime sufficient to toll the limitations period
if the act was committed with criminal negligence, which is defined as
"'wilful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others who might
reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.'" '
After the survey
period for this Article ended, the supreme court reversed in part, holding
that proof of criminal intent or negligence is unnecessary." Thus, the
statute of limitations will be tolled in a personal injury action whenever
"a traffic
citation is issued" for a violation of the Uniform Rules of the
1
Road. 29

M. Preemption, Immunity, and Justiciability
Georgia courts issued a number of noteworthy opinions in the area of
immunity during this survey period. The Georgia Court of Appeals in
Smith v. McDowell 30 reversed the lower court's finding of official
immunity for a school receptionist who released a student in violation of
the school's policy and procedures, resulting in the child's abduction. 3'
The court disapproved of a developing jurisprudence that reflected "a de
facto absolute immunity for school employees."3 2 Rejecting the
defendant's argument that she exercised discretion in her decision not
to follow the policy, the court held that the defendant violated a "hard
and fast policy with no exceptions," and therefore was not protected by
official immunity."'
As explained in Moreland v. Austin,"M the Federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)13 preempts Georgia law
on the issue of whether a litigant's treating physicians may speak
informally to counsel for the opposing party. 3 ' Any contact by oppos-

124.

O.C.GA § 9-3-99 (2007).

125.

No. S08G2078, 2009 WL 3062640 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009).

126.

O.C.G.A. ch. 40-6 (2007 & Supp. 2009).

127. Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 188-89, 667 S.E.2d 97, 100 (2008) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1(b) (2007)).
128.

Beneke, 2009 WL 3062640, at *1.

129. Id. at *2.
130. 292 Ga. App. 731, 666 S.E.2d 94 (2008).
131. Id. at 732-33, 666 S.E.2d at 95.
132. Id. at 734, 666 S.E.2d at 96.
133. Id. at 733-34, 666 S.E.2d at 96; see also Dollar v. Grammens, 294 Ga. App. 888,
893-94, 670 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2008).
134. 284 Ga. 730, 670 S.E.2d 68 (2008).
135. Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 18,
26, 29 & 42 (2006)).
136. Moreland, 284 Ga. at 733, 670 S.E.2d at 71.
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ing counsel with an adverse party's treating physician must be in
compliance with HIPAA regulations.1 37 The trial court has discretion
138
to fashion remedies for violation of these regulations.
At issue in Thomason v. Fulton County139 was a county ordinance
providing that judgments entered against county employees would be
paid by the county with the exception of any claim that was covered by
insurance.
The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against a county
employee, and the county tendered only the coverage provided under its
self-insurance plan. 4 ° The plaintiffs argued that self-insurance did
not qualify as "insurance" under the county ordinance, but the supreme
court disagreed, looking to the language of the resolution used to adopt
the self-insurance plan. 4
The resolution characterized the plan as
insurance and demonstrated the county intended to limit its liability to
the amounts provided for under the plan.'4 2
The plaintiff in Carmichaelv. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.143
sustained injuries as a passenger in a tractor-trailer that was part of a
supply convoy in Iraq, in which the driver was a civilian employee of
defendant contractors, but the convoy itself was under military
control. 144 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia held that the claims for negligent operation of the tractortrailer were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine because
the issue of negligence required examination of the military's training
of the civilian drivers, inspection of the drivers and vehicles, and
decisions regarding the path and speed of the convoy. 145 The convoy
was part of the military's strategy and, therefore, questioning decisions
about the convoy amounted to questions about military strategy and
146
battlefield tactics.

137. Id. at 735, 670 S.E.2d at 73.
138. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 72.
139. 284 Ga. 49, 663 S.E.2d 216 (2008).
140. Id. at 50, 663 S.E.2d at 216, 217.
141. Id. at 51, 663 S.E.2d at 217.
142. See id.
143. 564 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
144. Id. at 1364.
145. Id. at 1371-72.
146. Id. at 1370-72. As a second ground for finding the claims nonjusticiable, the court
agreed with the defendant that there were no judicially manageable standards for
determining what was reasonable in the context of driving a highly dangerous route in a
military zone. Id. at 1371-72.
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Attorney Fees

1. O.C.GA. § 9-11-68. In Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill,
LLC, 4 7 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that Georgia's "offer of settlement" statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-1168,1" constituted state substantive law that should be applied by
federal courts in diversity actions.'49 In so holding, the court determined that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 was not in conflict with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68,1"0 the federal "offer of judgment" rule." 1
While the court held that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 must be applied in
federal diversity cases, the court also certified questions to the Georgia
Supreme Court to determine whether the statute is constitutional.'52
The supreme court has not yet answered these certified questions. In
the interim, practitioners should be aware of the potential benefits and
risks of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 in federal court as well as state court.
2. O.C.G.AL § 9-15-14. In Olarsch v. Newell,"' the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-1514(b)1 14 and again emphasized the procedural prerequisites that must
be met to support an award of attorney fees.' 55 The trial court did not
specify "the conduct by the attorney or party upon which the award is
made,"" nor did it afford the offending party a chance "'to confront
and challenge testimony as to the value and need for legal services.'"'57
The court of appeals remanded and directed the trial court to give the
offending party an opportunity to be heard, and if the trial court still
awards fees, the trial court must "give an explanation of the statutory

147. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (2008).
148. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2006).
149. Wheatley, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
151. Id.; Wheatley, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-29.
152. Wheatley, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. The questions certified are:
1. Does O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 violate art. I, § 1,
12 of the Georgia Constitution?
2. Does O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 violate art. III, § 6, 9 4 of the Georgia Constitution?
3. If the answer to both questions 1 and 2 is "no," does O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 apply
to a case such as this, in which the Plaintiff asserts multiple claims, some of
which sound in tort and some of which do not?

Id.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

295 Ga. App. 210, 671 S.E.2d 253 (2008).
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2006).
Olarsch, 295 Ga. App. at 214, 671 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 213, 671 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. (quoting Mitcham v. Blalock, 214 Ga. App. 29,32-33,447 S.E.2d 83,87 (1994)).
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basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it." s As
such, any time a practitioner seeks to recover attorney fees, regardless
of the conduct of the other party, the practitioner must ensure all
procedural safeguards are satisfied.
0.

Arbitration
In Ed Voyles Jeep-Chrysler, Inc. v. Wahls,'59 the court of appeals
held that the defendant waived its contractual right to arbitration."c°
In that case, the defendants served discovery on the plaintiff, received
responses to that discovery, and noticed the deposition of the plaintiff. 6 ' The court determined that under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 2 the defendants had waived their right to compel arbitration
by "act[ing] inconsistently with the arbitration right, and, in so acting,
...
prejudic[ing] the other party.""s3 The court considered it a fairly
close question and ultimately affirmed the trial court."6 A defendant
who engages in any substantial litigation, especially including discovery,
before ultimately moving to compel arbitration under the FAA, clearly
risks losing the right to compel arbitration.
P. Access to Court Records
In the case of In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury," the Georgia
Supreme Court reaffirmed the secrecy to be afforded documents and
The issue before the court
information presented to a grand jury.'
was "whether documents and recorded testimony presented to a grand
jury carrying out its statutory civil responsibility to inspect or investigate any county office or its operations are 'court records' available for
public inspection" pursuant to an open records request.16 The court
cited the traditional secrecy afforded to both criminal and civil investiga-

158. Id. at 214, 667 S.E.2d at 257. The court of appeals also reversed the attorney fees
award because the action predated enactment of O.C.GA § 9-11-68, and retroactive
application of that statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 212, 667 S.E.2d at 256; see Fowler
Props., Inc. v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76, 78, 646 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2007).
159. 294 Ga. App. 876, 670 S.E.2d 540 (2008).
160. Id. at 878-79, 670 S.E.2d at 543.
161. Id. at 876, 670 S.E.2d at 541. The defendant subsequently cancelled the
deposition. Id.
162. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
163. Wahls, 294 Ga. App. at 877, 670 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting USA Payday Cash
Advance Ctr. #1, Inc. v. Evans, 281 Ga. App. 847, 849, 637 S.E.2d 418, 419 (2006)).
164. Id. at 878-79, 670 S.E.2d at 543.
165. 284 Ga. 510, 668 S.E.2d 682 (2008).
166. Id. at 513-14, 668 S.E.2d at 685.
167. Id. at 510, 668 S.E.2d at 682.
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tions conducted by the grand jury before holding that evidence and
testimony presented to the grand jury "are not 'court records' subject to
[Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule' 21] because the press and
public have not traditionally enjoyed access to such material due to the
preservation of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings."169
In Sharpton v. Hall,' a case of first impression, the Georgia Court
of Appeals confronted the issue of whether certain guardianship records
of a deceased incompetent adult could be unsealed when there was an
allegation that one of the ward's guardians breached his fiduciary duty
to the ward.'
After examining the text of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18(b), 72
which addresses interested parties' access to sealed. records, 73 the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order (1) refusing to unseal the
ward's medical records and (2) unsealing the guardianship records. 174
The court of appeals specifically held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion because "the public interest in protecting incompetent
adults from chicanery on the part of their guardians outweighs any
potential privacy interest of the ward."'75

Q. Insurance Issues
In ACCC Insurance Co. v. Carter,7 a declaratory judgment action,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed the following unique issue in Georgia's bad faith law:
When counsel for claimants against an insured party demands an
insurer pay the face amount of the policy, but refuses to release the
insured in return for the insurance company's payment, does the
insurer act in bad faith in paying policy limits without conditioning
payment on release of its insured?...
In the underlying tort action, the striking driver's insurance company
paid policy limits to the plaintiffs in exchange for a release of liability
as to the insurance company only. The plaintiffs and the striking driver
then entered a consent judgment for $4 million, and the striking driver
assigned any bad faith claims to the plaintiffs in exchange for the

168.

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 21.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

In re Gwinnett County, 284 Ga. at 513, 668 S.E.2d at 684-85.
296 Ga. App. 251, 674 S.E.2d 105 (2009).
Id. at 251, 674 S.E.2d at 105-06.
O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18(b) (Supp. 2009).
Id.
Sharpton, 296 Ga. at 253, 674 S.E.2d at 106-07.
Id.
621 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1280.
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protection of her personal assets. The striking driver's insurance
company sought resolution of whether it had previously acted in bad
faith.17
The district court declined to certify this question to the
Georgia Supreme Court, holding that the insurance company's conduct
was not actionable under Georgia's settled bad faith law because the
plaintiffs in the underlying tort action "(a) never offered to settle their
claims against [the striking driver] within the policy limits and (b)
explicitly stated, more than once, they refused
to release [the striking
179
driver] for a settlement at the policy limits."

In Thompson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 18 the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed a decision by the court of appeals... that was discussed
in last year's article.8 2 In Thompson the court of appeals held that a
settlement release for the liability insurer's policy limits, in which a
husband and wife both released claims, did not exhaust the available
liability coverage for either the husband or the wife, and therefore,
uninsured motorist coverage was recoverable." 3 While agreeing "'that
a party must exhaust available liability coverage before recovering under
a UM policy[,]'" 1" the supreme court disagreed that "the release
unambiguously shows that Mr. Thompson did not exhaust the limits of
the liability policy,""s holding instead that "the joint release in this
case does not necessarily indicate that Mrs. Thompson received a portion
of the proceeds for her own physical injuries.""s The supreme court
additionally held parol evidence could be considered to evaluate the
scope of the release because the uninsured motorist carrier was a
"stranger" to the release.' 87 Thus, the supreme court has solved one
precarious pitfall for practitioners trying to navigate the changing
uninsured motorist landscape.

178. Id. at 1281-82.
179. Id. at 1286.
180. 285 Ga. 24, 673 S.E.2d 227 (2009).
181. Id. at 29, 673 S.E.2d at 231.
182. See Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practice and Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 397, 405 (2008).
183. Thompson, 285 Ga. at 26, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
184. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290, 509
S.E.2d 41, 42 (1998)).
185. Id. at 27, 673 S.E.2d at 230.
186. Id. at 28, 673 S.E.2d at 231.
[n o
187. Id. The insureds filed an affidavit of their attorney that confirmed "m
funds
were paid or intended to be paid for the claims of [Mrs.] Thompson[,I' that her claims were
'nominal' and 'not worth pursuing,' and that '[tihe sole purpose of the settlement with the
liability carrier was to settle the claims of [Mr.] Thompson." Id. at 25, 673 S.E.2d at 229
(alterations in original). The court of appeals refused to consider the affidavit because it
was parol evidence. Id. at 26, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
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R. Causes of Action
In Ferrell v. Mikula,"' the court of appeals attempted to clarify the
somewhat muddied waters concerning the three semi-related torts of
false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious arrest." 9 The court
overruled a long line of cases by holding that the tort of malicious arrest,
codified in O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1,'" is actionable if the subject arrest was
without a warrant.19 '

In Mulligan's Bar & Grill v. Stanfield,'92 the defendant attempted

to stretch the protections of Georgia's Dram Shop Act"9 to include
immunity from ordinary premises liability claims."M The court of
appeals stated the obvious and affirmed that the Dram Shop Act has
express limitations, namely to injuries caused by drunk drivers, and is
not meant to provide wholesale insulation to a dram shop for all other
torts. 195

IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding statutes and cases constitute what the Authors deem
to be the more noteworthy alterations, illustrations, and clarifications to
Georgia law impacting trial practice and procedure within this survey
period.

188. 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
189. See id. at 331-33, 672 S.E.2d at 11-13.
190. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 (2000).
191. Ferrell, 295 Ga. App. at 333, 672 S.E.2d at 13, overrulingTodd v. Byrd, 283 Ga.
App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 249 Ga. App. 84, 547
S.E.2d 320 (2001); Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 463 S.E.2d 159 (1995);
McLeod v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 215 Ga. App. 177,449 S.E.2d 895 (1994); Mayor & Aldermen
of Savannah v. Wilson, 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994); Gantt v. Patient Comm.
Sys., Inc., 200 Ga. App. 35, 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Smith v. Embry, 103 Ga. App. 375, 119
S.E.2d 45 (1961).
192. 294 Ga. App. 250, 668 S.E.2d 874 (2008).
193. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).
194. Stanfield, 294 Ga. App. at 251, 668 S.E.2d at 875.
195. See id. at 252, 668 S.E.2d at 875-76. The court stated that
[c]ontrary to [the defendant's] argument, the Georgia Dram Shop Act was never
intended to and does not pertain to premises liability claims like the one before
this Court. Even liquor stores and bars are required to keep their premises safe,
and O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 irrefutably governs this matter and serves as the basis to
support the jury's verdict.
Id. (citing O.C.GA § 51-3-1 (2000)).

